St. Mary's Law Journal
Volume 2

Number 1

Article 11

3-1-1970

For Suspension of Driver's License to be Ordered under the Motor
Vehicle Security Responsibility Law, It Must be Determined
Whether There Is Reasonable Possiblity That Judgment May be
Recovered against the Driver in Question.
John A. Pizzitola

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
John A. Pizzitola, For Suspension of Driver's License to be Ordered under the Motor Vehicle Security
Responsibility Law, It Must be Determined Whether There Is Reasonable Possiblity That Judgment May be
Recovered against the Driver in Question., 2 ST. MARY'S L.J. (1970).
Available at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol2/iss1/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the St. Mary's Law Journals at Digital Commons at St.
Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. Mary's Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact sfowler@stmarytx.edu.

Pizzitola: For Suspension of Driver's License to be Ordered under the Motor

[Vol. 2

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

AUTOMOBILES-FINANCIAL
SION

OF DRIVER'S

LICENSE

RESPONSIBILITY STATUTE-FOR

'To

BE ORDERED

VEHICLE SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY

LAW,

IT

UNDER

MUST BE

THE

SUSPENMOTOR

DETERMINED

WHETHER THERE Is REASONABLE POSSIBILITY THAT JUDGMENT MAY
BE RECOVERED AGAINST THE DRIVER IN QUESTION. Williams v. Sills,

260 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1970).
Plaintiff sought to have the Motor Vehicle Security Responsibility
Law, N.J.S.A. 39:6-25, declared unconstitutional and to have its enforcement restrained. While stopped in a traffic line, the plaintiff, owner
and operator of an automobile, was involved in an accident. Her car
was struck in the rear and it in turn struck the car ahead. The plaintiff's
automobile was not covered by liability insurance, and the Division
of Motor Vehicles notified her that pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6-25 her
license would be suspended unless she did one of the following: (1)
deposited $400.00 security to cover any judgment or judgments for
damages resulting from the accident (that amount evaluated as damages
to one of the automobiles and its occupants); or (2) filed a release from
liability; or (3) filed a settlement agreement. The plaintiff neither
deposited security nor filed a release or a settlement agreement. It was
not until after the Division of Motor Vehicles notified the plaintiff
that her license would be suspended that they advised her that she
would be afforded an administrative hearing if she desired. The lower
court found the statute to be constitutional and plaintiff appealed.
Held-Reversed and remanded. For suspension of driver's license to be
ordered under the Motor Vehicle Security Responsibility Law, it must
be determined whether there is reasonable possibility that judgment
may be recovered against the driver in question.
At the present time, Massachusetts,' New York, 2 and North Carolina,
are the only states that require every motorist to carry liability insurance as a condition precedent to obtaining a driver's license. Practically
all of the remaining states have chosen to enact financial responsibility
laws in place of the specific requirement that the motorist carry liability insurance. It is virtually impossible and would serve little purpose
to set out the differences in the financial responsibility acts of the
individual states. Suffice to say that the majority of statutes enacted
among the states were patterned after early financial responsibility
legislation, the Vehicle Code of 1932, and its later revision in 1956,
4
the Uniform Vehicle Code.
1 ANN. LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS, ch. 90, § 34A-L (1967).
2 NEW YORK VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAWS § 312 (McKinney 1960).
8 NORTH CAROLINA GEN. STATS. §§ 20-309 to 20-319 (Supp. 1957).
4 NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON UNIFORM TRAFFIC LAWS & ORDINANCES,

CODE

§§

7-101 to 7-505 (1956).
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Financial responsibility legislation had its beginning in the state
of Connecticut 5 at about the time the automobile began playing an
important role in transportation in America. Financial responsibility
statutes have as their primary purposes the protection of the public
who may suffer as a result of a person's inability to meet his future
obligations; 6 the furnishing of a means providing security for damages
pending determination of negligence and liability; 7 and the protection
of citizens from negligent operation of vehicles by motorists without
insurance or adequate insurance.8 These laws have generally been
upheld as constitutional, satisfying due process requirements 9 and not
being discriminatory as an unreasonable classification of uninsured
motorists. 10
The authority of the states to suspend an uninsured motorist's driver's
license has been upheld as a valid exercise of the police power of the
state for the general welfare of the public." Must the requirements of
procedural due process be met before the state has the authority to
suspend an owner's driver's license? Specifically, are notice and hearing
required? The question of whether owning a driver's license is a privilege or a right has been answered in several different ways. In an
early New Jersey case, Garford Trucking Co. v. Hoffman, the court
held that a motor vehicle license is a mere privilege and may be re12
voked without first giving the person notice or the right to a hearing.
Later, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that possession of a driver's
license, although a privilege, is entitled to the same protection afforded
to property rights.'8 In Arizona, the driver's license is considered a
property right, 1 4 and in Texas, although a privilege, the principle of
due process is applicable to driver's licenses by virtue of the Texas
Constitution:
No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or in any manner disenfranchised, except by the
due course of the law of the land.15 (Emphasis added.)
To fulfill these procedural due process requirements, the different
5 CONNECTICUT PUBLIC ACTs, ch. 183 (1925).
6 Gray v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York, 286 F.2d 625 (4th Cir. 1960).
7 Oliveira v. Department of Public Safety, 309 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1958,
no writ).

8 Monk v. Ramsey, 443 S.W.2d 653 (Tenn. 1969).
9 Kesler v. Department of Public Safety of Utah, 369 U.S. 153, 82 S. Ct. 807, 7 L. Ed.2d
641 (1962); Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33, 62 S. Ct. 24, 86 L. Ed. 21 (1941).
10 Farmer v. Killingsworth, 424 P.2d 172 (Ariz. 1967).
11 Schecter v. Killingsworth, 380 P.2d 136 (Ariz. 1963); Gillaspie v. Department of Public
Safety, 152 Tex. 459, 259 S.W.2d 177 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 933, 74 S. Ct. 625, 98

L. Ed. 1084 (1954); State v. Stehlek, 56 N.W.2d 514 (Wis. 1953).
12 Garford Trucking Co. v. Hoffman, 177 A. 882 (N.J. 1935).
13 Bechler v. Parsekian, 176 A.2d 470 (N.J. 1961).
14 Schecter v. Killingsworth, 380 P.2d 136 (Ariz. 1963).
15 TEX. CONsr. art. I, § 19.
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financial responsibility statutes of the several states provide for notice 0
and hearing. 17 Specifically, N.J.S.A. 39:6-25 provides that when an uninsured motorist is involved in an automobile accident, he must do one
of three things. He must either deposit security with the director of
the Division of Motor Vehicles; file a release from liability; or file a
settlement agreement. Otherwise, his license will be suspended within
90 days after receipt of the accident report by the director of the Division of Motor Vehicles.' 8
In the principal case, the New Jersey Supreme Court questioned
the procedure allowing the superintendent of the Motor Vehicle Division to determine the amount of security required to be deposited
without taking into consideration the innocence or guilt of the uninsured motorist involved in the accident. Although the majority of
the states have upheld such actions by the directors of the various motor
vehicle divisions,' 9 the court instead rested its holding on later decisions
21
of the courts of Arizona 20 and California.
The court based its decision primarily on Orr v. Superior Court for
the City and County of San Francisco.22 In Orr, the California court
held that the department of motor vehicles must, to a certain extent,
consider culpability, in that a driver's license may not be suspended
unless there is reasonable possibility that judgment may be recovered. 23
The rationale of the Orr decision was drawn from an earlier California decision holding that the security deposit was not mandatory
for every uninsured motorist, but was mandatory for those from whom
a judgment might be recovered. 24 In Arizona, the security requirement
is based on the fact that a judgment may be recovered against the uninsured motorist. 25 The court considered the legislative intent rather
than strictly construing the words of the statute to determine if culpability was a prerequisite.
In the principal case the legislature must have considered culpability
as a prerequisite, especially when one contemplates the wording of the
entire act. Those uninsured motorists whose accident occurred while
16 N.J. REV. STAT. 39:6-25b (1961); TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6701h § 5b (1969);
CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-7-7(1) (1964).
17 N.J. REV. STAT. 39:6-50a (1961); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6701h § 2a (1969);
CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-7-7(2) (1964).
18 N.J. REV. STAT. 39:6-25b (1961).
19 Gillaspie v. Department of Public Safety, 152 Tex. 459, 259 S.W.2d 177 (1953), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 933, 74 S. Ct. 625, 98 L. Ed. 1084 (1954); Ballow v. Reeves, 238 S.W.2d
141 (Ky. 1951); Rosenblum v. Griffin, 197 A. 701 (R.I. 1938).
20 Schecter v. Killingsworth, 380 P.2d 136 (Ariz. 1963).
21 Orr v. Superior Court for the City and County of San Francisco, 454 P.2d 712 (Cal.
1969).
22
28
24
25

Id.
Id.

Escobedo v. State Department of Motor Vehicles, 222 P.2d I (Cal. 1950).
Schecter v. Killingsworth, 380 P.2d 136 (Ariz. 1963).
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legally parked,26 or while the vehicle was driven without their consent,2 7 are excused from the requirements of the Act.
By comparison, the Texas and New Jersey financial responsibility
acts are almost identical. The only variation in the two acts relating to
security deposits and suspension of licenses is the period of time allowed
in which compliance with the conditions of the statute must be had
before the uninsured's driver's license is suspended. In Gillaspie v.
Department of Public Safety, the constitutionality of the Texas act was
upheld, and the suspension of one's license was not based on the fault
of the uninsured motorist.2 The motorist is required to deposit security
with the Department of Public Safety regardless of whether he is at
fault.29
Although the weight of authority does not consider culpability, re88
2
cent decisions in Colorado," Arizona,8 ' California, and Pennsylvania
have required that a security deposit must be based on more than the
mere fact a motorist is not carrying liability insurance.
Should suspension of an uninsured motorist's driver's license be
based on culpability? In requiring a release of liability, the departments
of public safety are presupposing a legal cause of action against the
uninsured motorist. The possibility exists that the innocent uninsured
motorist may have his license suspended after an accident, while the
careless insured motorist is left completely free to continue driving
on the public streets and highways. Such a policy in no way promotes
safety and responsibility.
John A. Pizzitola
26 N.J. Rav. STAT. 39:6-26b (1961).
27 N.J. REv. STAT. 39:6-26c (1961).

28 Gillaspie v. Department of Public Safety, 152 Tex. 459, 259 S.W.2d 177 (1953), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 933, 74 S. Ct. 625, 98 L. Ed. 1084 (1954).
29Janssen v. Department of Public Safety, 322 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1959, no writ).
80 People v. Nothaus, 363 P.2d 180 (Colo. 1961).
81Schecter v. Killingsworth, 380 P.2d 136 (Ariz. 1963).
820rr v. Superior Court for the City and County of San Francisco, 454 P.2d 712 (Cal.
1969).
88 Miller v. Depuy, 307 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Penn. 1969).
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